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Claiborne ilardw are: A Major Step Beyond Picketing

In N,4ACP i. Claiborne Hardware,' the United States Supreme
Court for the first time addressed the constitutional issues which arise
from a political boycott.2 The dispute which led to Claiborne Hardware arose from a black community's frustration with the prevailing
racially prejudiced social structure. Over sixteen years after the boycott
began and nine years after it had been permanently enjoined, the
Supreme Court gave strong support to the boycott activities by holding
that they are protected under the first amendment. Justice Stevens described the boycott as possessing 'elements of criminality and elements
of majesty." '3 That comment set the tone of the opinion. The Court's
emphasis on the elements of majesty determined the outcome of the
case and will no doubt have repercussions well into the future. This
Note will look at the factual and legal background of the controversy.
will examine the Court's analysis. and will explore the possible ramilications of the holding.
I.

HISTORY OF THlE BoYcO'cIr

The population of Claiborne County. Mississippi is over threefourths black, yet in 1966 the business and civic power was in the hands
of the white population. In late 1965 or early 1966 the Claiborne
County branch of the NAACP was organized.4 Charles Evers. Field
Secretary of the NAACP, played an \.strumental role in its organization. Soon after the inception of the NAACP. the Human Relations
Committee was formed, and it presented a "petition for redress of
grievances"- to the leaders of the white community of Port Gibson, the
I

102 S Cc 3409 (1981)

2 The Supreme Court had denied review to the following political boycott case Msouri
v N".O W. 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir ). ceri. denied. 449 U.S 1004 (1980). where campaign for con.enhtion boycott of states which had not ratified the equal rights amendment was upheld as protected. Rousc Philadelphia. Inc. v. Ad iioc "78. 274 Pa. Super. 54. 417 A.2d 1248 (1979).

ert.,

dented, 449 U.S. 1004 (1980). where boycott of stores by picketers protesting government policies
and where there was no dispute with the stores was held not protected; and NAACP v. Overstreet.
221 Ga. 16. 142 S.E.2d 816 (1965). cert. dirmLrsed. 384 U.S. 118 (19661 (per curiam). where boycot
of store owner who allegedly had beat a black youth whom he had fired for alleged theft was held
not protected.
3. Claiborne Hardware. 102 S. Ct. at 3413.
4. Id at 3418. The pastor of the First Baptist Church was elected President: meetings were
held every Tuesday night. Id.
5. Id The petition contained nineteen demands, ranging in breadth from desegregation of
schools and bus stations to a request that blacks not be addressed in an offensive manner, such as
**boy' or "'shine." Id. at 3418-19.
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county seat. After several unfruitful meetings with representatives of
the white leaders, a second petition was presented and unanimously
approved by the approximately five hundred members present at the
NAACP meeting. The expressed purpose of the petition was to "gain
equal rights and opportunities for Negro citizens."' rhe petition also
expressed the hope that it would be unnecessary to employ a selective
buying campaign, an alternative if the demands were ignored. The demands were ignored. On April 1. 1966, with several hundred members
in attendance, the Claiborne County NAACP voted to boycott all
white merchants. Charles Evers was present and spoke on behalf of
instituting the boycott.7
Most of the boycott's activities were indisputably peaceful. These
activities included marches, pickets, and demonstrations. The marches
were carefully controlled and relatively few in number. The pickets
and demonstrations, which began in April, 1966. occurred sporadically
into the year

197 0 .'

This activity was conducted mostly on weekend's

by teenagers and later on even by young children, with the picketers
walking up and down the street in front of one group of stores one
time. another group another time.
A device used to influence blacks to participate in the boycott was
the stationing of "Deacons" or "Black Hats" (so denoted for the conspicuous black hats which made them clearly identifiable) outside the
boycotted stores. ' The "Black Hats" kept a list of names of those who
violated the boycott. These names were later read aloud at the weekly
NAACP meetings and published in a local black newspaper. These
named people were identified as "'traitors to the black cause, called
demeaning names, and socially ostracized for merely trading with
whites." "

Ten acts of violence were associated with the boycott. Half of these
occurred in 1966, the first year of the boycott. The other half are not
dated. It is worth relating these violent acts in detail here, not only
because the Court painstakingly described them, but more importantly,
because the Court's characterization of them as peripheral to and not
integral to the boycott was critical to its decision. There is sufficient
evidence to link four incidents directly to retribution for the victim's
noncompliance with the boycott. In two of these incidents shots were
6.
to Pet
7
8

Id at 3419 (quoting Appendix to Petition for Certiorari at 12b) [hereinafter cited as App.
for Cert.[.
Id at 3420.
Id at 3421 n.33.
9. Id at 3421.
10 Id at 5127 (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. at 19b)
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fired into two separate houses. I In another, someone threw a brick into
a car windshield. In a fourth, a teenager destroyed an elderly woman's
flower garden. There is insufficient evidence to definitely link the remaining incidents to retribution for noncompliance with the boycott.
In one such incident, shots were fired into the home of a couple who
had requested police escort to a white-owned dry cleaner. In another, a
NAACP member grabbed whiskey purchased from a white merchant
out of the hands of the black man who had purchased it. In still another incident, a man was beaten by four men. In a final incident. supported by only hearsay testimony. four black youths spanked ai elderly
black man after pulling down his coveralls. In the last two incidents
the causal connection to the boycott is even more tenuous. In one incident someone slashed tires and in the other someone phoned a boycott
violator and threatened to "whip" him.' 2
Several external events affected the boycott.' 3 An event in 1969 was
of greatest impact. A young black man was shot by a white officer
during a scuffle while he was being arrested by two Port Gibson policemen. Unrest caused by this event led to the imposition of a dawn to
dusk curfew. The following day Charles Evers spoke to blacks gathered at the First Baptist Church and led them in a march to the courthouse. One of the several speeches which Evers made that day was
recorded by the police. This highly impassioned speech. which was
later scrutinized by the Court, made references to "discipline" of boycott violators. Two days later, while the emotional pitch of the black
community was still very high, Evers spoke again and made the statement, "If we catch any of you going in any of them racist stores, we're
gonna' break your damn neck." 4
On October 31, 1969, some of the boycotted merchants filed suit to
recover lost earnings and lost good will from 1966 to 1972 and to enjoin
all boycott activities."

11.

HISTORy O: "rHi- LITIGATION

Seventeen white merchants, many of whom were also civic leaders in
I I One of these incidents resulted in a conviction which was revcrsed on appeal Whitney v
State. 205 So 2d 284 (Miss. 1967).
12. ('latbone Ilardw'are. 102 S. Ct. at 3422.

13. In
one month.
3420.
14 Id
15 Id

1967 a black policeman was hired. Thc boycott was lifted on several merchants for
In 1968 the boycott tightened following Martin Luther King's assassination Id. at
(quoting App. to Pet. for Cc. at 27b).
at 3413 Lost earnings and lost good will during this seven ycar per3od allcCedlh

amounted to S944.699. Statutory anti-trust penalties of S6.00.0 and attorney*% fees of S3X).000
brought the final judgment to S 1.250.699. plus interest from the date of judgment and costs d at
14115
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Claiborne County, 6 filed a complaint naming 148 defendants. 7 The
complaint alleged liability for the tort of malicious interference." vio-

lation of a Mississippi statute prohibiting a secondary boycott, " and
violation of a Mississippi anti-trust statute.2 0 The action came to trial
in the Chancery Court of Hinds County on June 11, 1973.2' The chancellor found liability based on all three theories against all defendants.22 The chancellor specifically rejected the defendants' assertion of
first amendment protection. Damages were awarded for the full
amount sought and a permanent injunction was ordered against all
boycott activities.2 3
In December 1980, after several delays.24 the Mississippi Supreme
Court considerably altered the chancellor's findings. Liability was upheld against most defendants with r.' vect to only the tort of malicious
interference. 2 - Unlike the local Chaacery Court.2' the Mississippi
Supreme Court based their holding upon "the agreed use of force, violence. and threats . . .[which] makes the present state of facts a con16

Id at 3414 n.3
17 Id at 3414 The defendants consisted of one hundred Ioly-fiur individual. who participaled in the boycolt in varying capacities. Charles Evers. Field Secretary of the NAACP. Ilcnr,
Aaron. president of the Mississippi NAACP; the national NAACP: and the Mississippi Action for
Progress. Id.
IX See in/'a note 44.
19 Miss Code Ann § 97-23-85 (1972) For further discussion about secondary boycotts in a
non-labor context. see rnia text accompanying notes 33-35 and text accompanying notes 113-14
20. Miss Code Ann. § 75-21-7 (1972).
21 Clathorne I/ardware. 102 S.Ct. at 3414 Because the complaint requested an attachment
in equii . the Chancery Court had jurisdiction. The Chancery Court had power to empanel a jury
hut it chose not to do o Consequently the d-fcndants had no jury trial with respect to the issue%
of liability. The trial was also considerably delayed by collateral proceedings in federal court. See
id at n 5
Liability under the
22 l:ighteen defendants were dismissed by stipulation. Id. at 3414 n.t,.
iwo Mi sissippi statutes extended to each defendant directly even though participation in the concerted action was voluntary and intentional. The U.S Supreme Court found the trial court's
finding oftor liability "not clear" as to whether it was necessary to prove the existence of an
agreement in order to conclude there was a conspiracy. As a conspiracy. liability would extend to
each conspirator. The chancellor clearly did not make a fact finding that such an agreement did
exist Id at 3415 n.9. 3417 n.16
23 Id at 3416.
24. Id After the Chancery Court judgment. the defendants moved for relief from the Mississippi 125 percent supersedeas bonding requirement. The motion was denied, however a federal
court enjoined execution of the judgment pending appeal of an instrumental Mississippi case. Id
at n.ll.
25. Id at 3416.
26 The Mississippi Supreme Court rejected a finding of liability under the Mississippi restraint of trade statute due to the recent Supreme Court finding in which they held political boycorts are not a violation of the Sherman Act. The Mississippi Supreme Court rejected a finding of
liability under the Mississippi secondary boycott statute, finding it inapplicable since the statute
was not enacted until the boycott had already been in effect for more than two years. The statute
gave no indication of retrospective effect. Furthermore. the Mississippi Supreme Court dismissed
thirty-scven defendants for lack of proof. See id at 3416. 3417 & n.10.
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spiracy." 27 The boycott was unlawful. Because it was unlawful and
because unlawful activity cannot receive constitutional protection, the
court reasoned that the boycott could not receive first amendment protection. In this way the whole question of first amendment protection
was circumvented. The court viewed damages as excessive in light of
the evidence presented and remanded for a further proceeding to recompute them. The injunction remained in effect." The United States
Supreme Court subsequently granted a writ of certiorari.

1ll.

HISTORY OF THE APPLICABLE LAW

A political boycott is one which is motivated by non-economic concerns-usually one where aggrieved participants protest against some
alleged injustice. 2' This method of protest, which has gained popularity since 1950,3' has prompted recent litigation. This litigation has resulted in various attempts to define the conflicting interests of the
boycotters and the affected businesses. Because there had been no
United States Supreme Court decision regarding political boycott law
before Claiborne Hardware and because picketing is often an integral
part of a political boycott, proponents of political boycotts have relied
heavily on the constitutional protection given picketing in the 1940
landmark case of Thornhill r.Alabama.' Although Thornhill arose
from a labor dispute, it was the first case in which the Supreme Court
gave first amendment protection to picketing.3 2 The Thornhill Court
based its decision upon the theory that the picket is like a pamphlet in
its role to disseminate informatior of the dispute to the public. This
view brought picketing into the category of speech-plus rather than
conduct."
As speech-plus it acquired first amendment protection
27 Id. at 3416.
2K Even though the boycott was long over at this time and the injunction thereby a moot
pIx nt. the court did not vacate the injunction. Id. at 3417 n.18.
29, See Note. Pohical Sorcon .4timr and the First Amendmeni. 91 IIARv L. Ri v. 659. 660
(1978)
30. Id at 659.
31, 310 U.S. 88 (1940). In 7hornuill. the United States Supreme Court invalidated a state law
which forbade all union picketing on the basis of ovcrbreadth. However. subsquent case.%culminating in Teamsters Local 695 v. Vogt. 354 U.S. 284 (1957) upheld state law which banned peaceful picketing in the labor area. L. TRIbE. A.,-RICAtN COr STITUTIONAL LAw 598 n.2 (1978).
32. 310 U.S. at 88.
33. See Note. supra note 29. at 669. The speech-plus category of protected activity was first
established in Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965). where the court described picketing as conduct (subsequently labeled "speech-plus") rather than speech and subject to regulation even
though intertwined with expression and association. Speech-plus was later refined in United
States v. O'Brien. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). where the Supreme Court held that when speech and
speech-plus are combined in the same activity, only a compelling governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitation on first amendment freedom-,.
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within certain limits.'
Opponents of the political boycotts have devised several strategies in
an attempt to claim political boycotts violate state law. One method
has been to apply secondary boycott law. Although secondary boycotts
in the labor area are easily distinguishable,. some states have passed
so-called secondary boycott statutes which apply outside of the labor
area. These statutes are aimed at prohibiting non-labor boycotts directed against a victim who is outside the primary dispute. In other
words they are aimed at preventing the "scapegoat boycott."3 ' The objection to such boycotts is that the victim has no control over or power
to affect the primary dispute.31
A second approach of boycott opponents has been to invoke the
Sherman Act' or a similar state anti-trust statute 31 in an attempt to
show the boycott serves as an illegal restraint on trade. The elements of
a restraint of trade are present in a political boycott situation.4" Although on one occasion the Sherman Act was applied successfully to a
non-economic boycott," the decision in Eastern Railroad Presidents
Conference t, Noerr Motor Freight. Inc.4 , in 1961 greatly undermined
34. These limits were described in Thornhill to be I) the picket must be conducted in a peacefulmanner and 2) the grievance must be truthful. 310 U.S. at 104-05.
In an effort to more meaningfully articulate when picketing is legal versus illegal, one commentitor suggested categorizing picketing as -signal picketing'" (picketing by those who are sutliciently powerful to coerce their audience) versus "publicity picketing" (picketing whereby
sympathies are enlisted by appeals and persuasion). According to this scheme, signal picketing is
unprotected conduct and publicity picketing is pure speech to which the Brandenburg test may be
applied. See Note. The Invisible l/andand the Clenched Fist: Is There a Safe 1rs"to Picket Under
the Airst
Amendment. 26 IIASTINO;S L.J. 167 (1974).
35. Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act makes it an unfair labor practice to apply pressure dircected at a neutral employer to induce him to take certain action. In
N.L.R.B. v. Fruit Packers Local 760. 377 U.S. 58 (1964). the Supreme Court construed this provistun outlawing secondary boycotts to not prohibit -picketing which persuaded consumer%to boy .
cott the %truckproduct but only prohioited the union from asking customers not to patrontic the
secondary employer." The Court stated a broad ban against picketing might collide with the first
.imendment.
Last Term the Supreme Court had to determine whether a Stevedore work stoppage affecting
cargo destined for the Soviet Union was an illegal secondary boycott or was a protected political
activity. The court found the activity illegal under Section 8(b)(4) of the National Labor RclaIons Act and not protected by the first amendment. International Longshoremen's As,,*n v. Allied
Int'l. Inc.. 102 S. Ct. 1656 (1982).
36. Note. Scapegoat Picketing.- Be~.ond the Pale ofConlrtitutiunal Protection. 48 :oRInIIAM IL..
Risv. 794. 794-95 (1980).
37 Id at 795.
38, Sherman Antitrust Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982).
39. See supra note 20.
40. Section one of the Sherman Act prohibits any combination or conspiracy in the restraint
of trade among the states. 15 U.S.C. § I. See Sandifer & Smith. The Tort Suit/or Damages.- The
Yew Threat to Civil Rights Organizations. 41 BROOKLYN L. Ri-v. 559. 573 11981).
41. In Council of Defense of New Mexico v. International Magazine Co.. 267 F. 390 (8th Cir
1920). state officials were found guilty of violating the Sherman Act when they urged the public
not to buy publications of the magazine company to protest the printing of unpatriotic matcrijl.
42. 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
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this approach. In Noerr Motor Freight. truckers brought an anti-trust
suit against the railroad because it had conducted a publicity campaign
in the state legislature which resulted in economic harm to the truckers.
Although trade was restrained, the Court refused to apply the Sherman
Act. They held that the railroad activity was political, not economic.
and that the purpose of the Sherman Act was to regulate only economic
activity.4 3 In short, the case turned on a consideration of the boycott's
purpose. The Noerr Motor Freight result served to dampen prospects
of anti-trust statutes as a viable means of combatting political boycotts.
A third approach has been to allege the tort of interference, a common law cause of action dating back to 1893 in England." Although
not required as an element, most courts use the term "malice" to describe the nature of the conduct. Justification is recognized as a defense
to an action for interference. Acts of violence and threats of violence
are signs of an illegality. However, a person is privileged to interfere
with the prospective economic advantage of another if he acts to protect a legitimate interest of his own and if the methods used are otherwise lawful and proper under the circumstances. In this case the
detriment which results to the interferee is deemed incidental to the
lawful effort of the interferer to promote his own welfare. It is significant that damages may be awarded for all losses legally caused by the
interference, provided there is sufficient proof.4 "
Another approach is to allege that the boycott constitutes a conspiracy. " In this context, the conspiracy is the agreement to pursue a lawful objective by unlawful means.4 7 According to this theory, -[A]ny
acts which may be called coercive methods will convert a legal boycott
into a conspiracy." 4 Acts of intimidation are sometimes also dispositi , of a conspiracy. Conspiracy may be advanced singly as a cause of
action49 or in conjunction with any of the other methods used to attack
the legality of a boycott.5"
43
44

Id
Tcmperton v Rusncll. 11,931 I Q B 715. 62 LJ Q.B. 412

The elcncnts of hc tort ol

intcrlcren c arc. I ) the existence of a valid business cpcctancN. 2) knowledge of the expectinc%
b%the interferer. 3) a showing of a causal etrcet between the mntcr'crcncc and the lo,.s
of economic

ad,,antagc. and 4) damages to the mcrferce. See Restatement of Torts § 766 (1939). Regarding
the third element. some courts have held it is sufficient to show only a reasonable probability that
-but for" the interference there would have bcen .a business relationship Crystal Gas o. v
Oklahoma Natural Gas Co.. 529 P.2d 987 tOkla. 1974). Martin v Philhps Petroleum Co.. 455
S W 2d 429 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970). Contra. Lewis v. Bloede. 202 :. 7 (4th Cir. 1912). Louis

Kamm. Inc. v. Flink. 113 N.J.L. 582, 175 A. 62 (1934).
45. Seegenera/r. 45 Am. JUR. 2d. Interference .§ I. 3-6. II. 12. 14. 16. 22. 27-28. 30. 57.
46. Comment. The Consumer Boa-coit. 42 Miss. L.J. 226. 236-37 (1971).
47 Id at 237.

48. Id. at 237 citing Root v Anderson. 290 Mo App. 201. 207 S.W. 255 11918;).
49 Id at 236.
50 The Mississippi Supreme Court found liability based on a common law tort in conjunction with the presence of a conspiracy. Claiborne HIardware. 102 S. (t.at 3414-15 n.7
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IV.

ANALYSIS OF THE CASE

The Supreme Court considered the following three issues:"'
A) whether a boycott which was accomplished by the banding together of those who sought to eradicate racial inequality and supported
by organizational meetings. nonviolent picketing, and speeches to persuade others to join the cause is protected activity under the first

amendment despite the harm incur ed by affected merchants:-":
B) whether damages which follow from the violent acts connected
with a political boycott are limited to the direct consequences of those
violent acts, and whether damages may be imposed upon an individual
due to his association with those who actually do commit violent acts:"
C) whether there is a basis to sustain judgment against any of the
petitioners for their involvement in the boycott., 4
A.

Nonviolent PoliticalBoycott is Protected

The Court used a balancing test. It first looked to the constitutional
protection afforded the boycott. Then it examined the government's
interests which would be served by preventing the boycott. The Court
dismembered the boycott into its constituent elements: I) the banding
together for a collective effort with a political purpose, 2) pickets. demonstrations, and marches, 3) public speeches and personal solicitation
of others to join the cause.Y The main element consisted of the banding together; the other elements were seen as supporting activities.
In examining the banding together for a collective effort, the Court
relied on Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley.56 There the Court
extended freedom of association to "the practice of persons sharing
common views banding together to achieve a common end."" Likewise the banding together of the blacks of Claiborne County should be
protected by the freedom of association. The Court relied on NAACP
i Alabama for the proposition that group association enhances the effective advocacy of a point of view, especially a controversial one.:"
51. The anti-trust and secondary boycott issues did not need to be resolved by the Supreme
Court See supra note 26.
52. Claihorne lardware. 102 S. Ct. at 3422-23
53 Id at 3427-30.
54. Id at 3430.
55. Id at 3423-24.
56. 454 U.S. 290 (1981).
57. Claiborne Hardware. 102 S. Ct. at 3423 (quoting Rent Control. 454 U.S. 290).
58. 357 U.S. 449 (1958). Over the years the Supreme Court has been particularly protective
of NAACP activity. See Gibson v. Florida Legislative Comm.. 372 U.S. 539 (1963); NAACP v.
Button. 371 U S. 415 (1963). It would seem that the racial factor is the only means by which to
explain several instances where the Supreme Court has given a particularly expansive reading to
various constitutional rights. Note. supra note 29. at 661 n.18.

https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol14/iss1/15

8

Iddings: Claiborne Hardware: A Major Step beyond Picketing

286

NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL L4W JOULRNAL

The separate violent acts of a few did not alter this protection." Peaceful assembly cannot be made a crime merely because some "persons
assembling have committed crimes elsewhere."' 0 The violent acts committed by some boycott participants did not taint the first amendment
protection of those blacks who banded together to protest their longsuffered unequal treatment in their community.
The Court then examined the other activities which supported the
boycott. The Court applied the rule from Thornhill"' to extend first
amendment protection to the picketing. The picketing associated with
the boycott satisfied the Thornhill test. It was peaceful. Its function
was to inform the public of the picketers' grievance. The peaceful
marches and demonstrations were protected by rights of free speech,
free assembly. and freedom to petition for redress of grievances."2
The Court viewed elements of public address and personal solicitation as "'speech in its most direct form."'" The threat of social ostracism and persuasion through social pressure achieved by reading
names of boycott violators at NAACP meetings and publishing those
names in a local black newspaper were characterized by the Court as
methods of "persuasion." Yet the Court relied on Organizationfora
Better Austin r. Keefe.' In Keefe the Court held that offensive and
coercive speech was nonetheless a form of protected communication.
The defendant's use of distributing leaflets critical of the plaintill's
business practices was seen as "peaceful pamphleteering." i.e., protected communication." In this way the Court approved such techniques despite the presence of coercion and intimidation, thereby
rejecting previous distinctions made by some concerning the protected
nature of persuasion as contrasted with the unprotected nature of coercion "' The Court did not consider coercion an illegal means but rather
a means to convey information. The Court noted with approval that a
boycott was being used to effectuate social change rather than riot or
revolution. 7 Coercion is an acceptable means of effectuating such
change.
In examining the countervailing state interests, the Court recognized
the legitimate and strong government interest in certain forms of economic regulation. However, the Court held that the state's broad
power to regulate economic activity was insufficient to prohibit peace59.
60.
61.
62.
63
64.
65.
66.
67.

i)eJonge v. Oregon. 299 U.S. 353. 365 (1937).
Id
310 U.S. 88 (1940). See supra note 34.
Edwards v, South Carolina. 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
(larborne Ilardware. 102 S. Ct. at 3424.
402 U.S. 415 (1971).
Id at 419.
See 5upra note 34.
Claiborne Iardware. 102 S. Ct. at 3425.
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ful political activity such as that found in this case due to the
"profound national commitment" to wide open debate on public
68
issues.
The Court reemphasized the importance of the purpose of the boycott by invoking Eastern RailroadPresidentsConference . Noerr Motor
Freight.6" In Noerr Motor Freight, the railroad waged a publicity campaign against the truckers. Even though economic harm was foreseen
and intended, the primary purpose of the campaign was to vindicate
constitutional rights. In the same way, the ClaiborneHardware boycotters foresaw and intended to cause economic harm to the white
merchants, however, the primary motivation was political. Instead the
Court focused on the purpose and held that first amendment protection
of activity expressive of political views outweighed the disruptive effect.
B.

Damage Limitations

The Court turned its attention to those activities not constitutionally
protected. "'The First Amendment does not protect violence."'" The
Mississippi Supreme Court had imposed liability based on the tort of
malicious interference. The United States Supreme Court did not
overturn that finding but severely limited its application and the scope
of recoverable damages.
Generally the standard for recovery for the tort of interference is for
all reasonably ascertainable losses." However, the Court looked instead to the damage award in United Mine Workers r. Gibbs7 2 where
the remedy was "strictly confined to the direct consequences .
In Gibbs. the cause of action was a state claim of tortious interference
with the employment relationship. This is analogous to the Claiborne
Hardware state claim of tortious interference in a non-labor context.
The careful limitation of damages imposed in Gibbs resulted from the
need to accommodate state law with federal labor policy. In other
words, the federal labor policy was given pre-eminence so as to affect
the damage award under the state claim."' "That limitation is no less
applicable, however, to the important First Amendment interests at issue in this case."" The Court considered the constitutional protections
sufficiently important to again limit damages to just those direct conse68. Id at 3426 (quoting New York Times v Sullivan. 376 U.S.
69. 365 U.S. 127 (1961). It is noteworthy that in this case the
rejected the validity of a claim of violation of the Sherman Act. Id
70. Claiborne Hlardware. 102 S. Ct. at 3427.
71. See 5upra note 44.
72. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
73. Claiborne lardware. 102 S. Ct. at 3428 (quoting United Mine
715. 729 (1966)).
74. 383 U.S. at 730-31.
75. Claiborne Htardware. 102 S. Ct. at 3429.
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quences of only violent acts. -[The state] may not award compensation
for the consequences of non'iolent, protected activity."'
Further, the Court held liability could not be imposed merely because of group association. To attach liability to an individual because
of his or her association with a group having bo'h legal and illegal
goals would impair legitimate political expression."" Liability cannot
be imposed unless there is clear proof of specific intent to resort to the
violent aims of an organization. One may not be punished for sympathy with the legitimate aims of the organization.' 5
In Hear r. Janes." th-se principles were applied in a civil case. The
Court inferred from the Scales, Noo. and Heall" holdings that "'[civil
liability mdy not be imposed mercly because an individual belonged to
a groi.,, some members of which committed acts of violence."' "
Rather the test for liability posed by the Court rested upon a showing
of both the experience of unlawful goals and specific intent to further
those goals."
Application of this test to the instant case resulted in the Supreme
Court's rejection of the Mississippi Supreme Court's damage award for
all business losses. Evidence showed that "threats" of violence caused
.'many" blacks to avoid white merchants out of fear and "contributed"
to the success of the boycott.' 2 Such evidence was ambiguous and insufficient to "assure the precision of regulation demanded by the firt
amendment."" ' This evidence did not demonstrate that all losses resulted from violence or threats of violence. In fact, the record shows
some losses were caused by the voluntary acts of many participants."
76. Id (emphasis added) The exception to this rule is presented in Milk Wagon I)rier's
Union v Mcadowmoor Daries. 312 U.S. 287 (1941) The Court spccifical1% di.,tiguiNhed the
present case from .1leadom'moor. In .tIeadowmnor. the Court upheld an injunction again.t bith
virulent and nonviolent activitv becau.e there the violence was 'pcrvasi,,.'" That opinion noted
"i.nsubstantial findings of factis of violenccl %crecningreacity" would defeat their holding Id at
293 Unlike ,leadoxwmoor. here the facts point to only isolated acts of violence. The Court held
thc.e are indeed -insubstantial findings" and not worth% of imposing damages for all lo.scs o'.cr
,,even years where many losses were the result of voluntary participation in the ho',cott and other
activitics overwhelmingly peaceful. Clashirne llardare. 102 S. Ct. at 3432.
77 See Scales v. United States. 367 U.S. 203. 229 (1961).
78 Noto v. United States. 367 U.S. 290. 299-300 11961).
79. 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
80 ('laiborne Ilardi are. 102 S. Ct. at 3430.
81 Id. The Court distinguished between the situation where an ind,.aidual is not liable for
damages merely by reason of his association from the situation where an indis idual may be liable
because he himself authorized or incited unlawful conduct. Id at 3430 n.56.
82. Id at 3430-31.
83. Id at 3430. The Mississippi Supreme Court's findings of coercion wkere vaguely cxpress d as forming "'pariof the boycott" and overcame "'the volition of mani- black persons - Id
at 3430
84. The Court found it significant that even those ,ho suffered violent recrimination for
refusing to honor the boycott continued to act voluntanly by continuing to trade with while
merchants. Id at 3431 n.63.
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The Court held that only those losses attributable to the illegal acts
could be included in any damage award.
C. Judgrnent
The Court reviewed the Mississippi Supreme Court's imposition of
damages in light of the Court's theory of damages. The petitioners fell

into the following categories: "

1)boycott managers (ninety petitioners

who either regularly attended or served in leadership capacity at
NAACP meetings): 2) boycott enforcers (twenty-two petitioners who
served as store watchers or as "Black Hats;" 3) those who committed or
threatened to commit violent acts (sixteen petitioners so identified by
direct evidence); 4) Charles Evers, and 5) the NAACP.
The Court held that there was no basis for imposing liability against
boycott managers. The NAACP espoused no unlawful aims; thus.
there was no question of whether boycott managers specifically intended to further them. Nor was there evidence to show they authorized or ratified illegal conduct. The Court summarily found no basis
for imposing liability against the boycott enforcers, stating that there is
nothing unlawful in standing outside a store recording names or in
wearing black hats."
The Court considered liability against Charles Evers "'with extreme
care.'""' The Court characterized Evers' comments concerning the possible breaking of necks and other discipline as advocacy rather than as
fighting words. As advocacy of use of force, his speech had to satisfy
the test of Brandenburg i,Ohio " to retain its protection. The Court
.45 Id. at 3417-18. The Court accepted the respondent's categorization of petitioners as identilied in respondent's Supplemental Bncf I. Supplemental Bnef I was filed in response to a question Ahich arose at oral argument concerning the factual basis for the judgment of the Mississippi
Supreme Court where liability rested upon the fact that each petitioner had agreed to effectuate
the boicoit through acts of violence. Respondents contended managers and leaders had full
knowledge of the tactics of the enterpnse and thereby assented to those tactics. The respondents
contended a court could reaonably infer an intention to frighten people from the pattern establihed by warnings to prospective customers and public displays of weapons and military discipline followed by cts of violence against boycott violators. These groups were not exclusive. Id
at 3.117 nn 20-21. 3418 n.22.
X6 The Court's offhand treatment of the boycott enforcer's role is greatly contrasted to their
detailed account of the acts of violence which were more isolated and spanned a shorter period of
time
t7 Clarborne Iardware. 102 S.Ct. at 3433. In addition to considering the protected nature
of his speeches. the Court also considered the protected nature of Evers' conduct. Evers participated in the boycott as a leader in the organization of the boycott and by persuading M.A.P. to
buy food from only black-owned stores. The Court held Evers could not be liable for his leadership role for the same reasons none of the managers could be held liable. Evers could not be held
liable for his acts of persuasion as they were constitutionally protected. Consequently. all of Evcrs' conduct was beyond a finding of liability. Id at 3433-34.
U8. 395 U S 444 11969) The Brandenburg test provides that speech as advocacy is protected
"except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is
likely to incite
or produce such action." Id at 447.
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held the empassioned speeches of Evers did fall within the bounds of
protected speech. that is. did satisfy the Brandenburg test. The Court
acknowledged the purpose of the speech was to urge the -black citizens
to unify. to support and respect each other, and to realize the political
and economic power available to them."'
The ClaiborneHardware opinion raises a question regarding the current status of the Brandenburg rule. In applying the rule the Court
quoted the Brandenburg test directly.' But the Court continued in an
unexpected manner by adding "[ilf that language had been followed by
acts of violence, a substantial question would be presented whether Evers could be liable for the consequences of that unlawful conduct.The Court noted that no acts of violence did follow the 1969 speech.
and those which followed the 1966 speech occurred "weeks or
months"' after that speech. In other words, the Court used hindsight
before making its final determination that Evers was not liable. The
Brandenburg test looks instead at whether the speech in question is
'likely to incite .... ."' This is a foresight test. Arguably. the Brandenburg rule has been changed or perhaps extended in Claiborne Hardware. Only future cases invoking the Brandenburg rule will shed light
on this question. The Court concluded "'ainadvocate must be free to
stimulate his audience with spontaneous and emotional appeals for
This is consistent with the
unity and action in a common cause.
national commitment to -uninhibited. robust, and wide open debate. " " Once again the Court was stating its especial tolerance for expression of political views.
Since the Court denied liability against Evers. there could be no vicarious liability :gmnst his principal, the NAACP. Furthermore. there
was no evidence of NAACP ratification of or specific knowledge of acts
of violence or threats of violence. "' The NAACP supplied no funds
nor was it connected with the boycott in any way.' Accordingly. the
NAACP could not be held liable, directly or indirectly.
vv

C'ad,rne Hardeai.

102 S Ct at 3434

90. Id At 3433-34

91 /, at :434
Y2 /
3 S'e supa note h,1
94 Clabornr Iadware. 102 S. CL at 3434.
95. AL (quoting New York Times v. Sullivan. 376 U.S. 254. 270 (19641. The Coun tlcd
that Evers* refcrcncc-s to dicpline in the speech ould be used to corroborate other eisdcncc of
Authorizaton of wrongful conduct. Linabiity for authorzation of iarongful conduct failted how.
n3sc]s -that 1zIers
ccr "for the sample reaso there is no exience -apal from the speches thm.
auihorcd" acts of %olencc that occunrcd. Id
9% Id

97 Id
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REFLECTIONS ON CL41,9ORNE HARDWARE

Even though the boycotters intended to cause economic harm to the
merchants of Claiborne County, the primary political motivation of the
boycotters overrode a finding of liability for the resulting damages.
The Supreme Court concluded that the banding together to achieve
racial equality was activity protected by the freedom of association and
freedom of speech and outweihed the legitimate state interest in regulating local business affairs.' The Mississippi Sureme Court had
characterized this same activity as a conspiracy. stating that the
"agreed use of force, violence, and threats against the peace to achiet-e a
goal make the present state of facts a conspiracy."'
The Supreme
Court endorsed activity which the Mississippi Supreme Court enjoined.
Central to the different conclusions is the different ways in which the
two courts handled two important aspects of the boycott.
The first difference is the manner in which the two courts characterized the group efforts. On the one hand. the Supreme Court focused on
activities of individuals acting separately. At the outset of the opinion
the Supreme Court created a picture of individuals voluntarily coming
together to make a political statement rather than creating a picture of
a group which acted as a unit. The Court pointed to the close nexus
between the freedoms of speech and assembly. '" ' On the other hand.
the Mississippi Supreme Court assumed an implicit agreement among
the participants."- This agreement is necessary to a conspiracy theory.
A second difference is the manner in which the two courts treated the
presence of coercion. The Supreme Court confronted this presence of
coercion by cleverly using coercion to describe the personal solicitation
of would-be boycott participants. i.e.. by putting it in a speech context.
Coercive speech is not unprotected."'' Hwever. the Mississippi
Supreme Court used the coercion and threats to describe the entire effort and thereby placed it in a conspiracy context."" A conspiracy using methods of coercion is illegal. Simply stated, the two courts'
different treatment of the issue of coercion can be stated thus: coercion
renders a conspiracy illegal. but coercion in speech is acceptable.
A weakness of Claiborne Hardware is the lack of attention to the
99 Id at 3426-27 The Court qualfied itsholding in a siagnficant footnote See ili'a tet
.aW.4mpan),ng notes 113-14.
'9 Cadrn I/ardxwn. 102 S. CL at 3416. The Mhssippi Supreme Court alo based ia.
bility under the ton of mterfetence So .wp oe 44.
100. Clatboine Ilaraswr. 102 S.Ci at 3416 (quoting App. to Pet. for Cen. at 23a) (cmphasn
Added)
101 Id at 3423 (quoting from NAACP v Alabama. 357 U S 449. 460 t I9.S))
1112 Ita noteworthy that neither the Chancery nor the Mawsppe Supreme Court made a
factual finding that an agreement eisted. Id at 3417 a 36.
103 Id at 3425
104 Id at 3416 lquoting App. to Pet for Cm. a 23s)a
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content of the specific demands of the protestors. It focused only on the
purpose of the demands. There are cases in which the reasonableness
of the demands has been determinative. ' This raises a question of
how courts will treat a political boycott with a legitimate purpose. such
as eradicating racial inequality, where the specific demands are absurd
or even just unreasonable.
The endorsement by the Supreme Court of the NAACP boycott
raises the question whether this case is a continuation of the line of
picketing cases."° Undoubtedly. ClaiborneHardware is the next logical step. Basically the approach is the same: freedom of association
and freedom of speech protect both picketing and boycotts if they are
not outweighed by countervailing governmental interests. Viewed as a
form of expression. picketing which passed muster was called speechplus. M The Supreme Court did not use this language to describe the
boycott. However. by concluding that the political boycott here was
protected it too would qualify as speech-plus. "' "
Claiborne lardware represents enthusiastic approval of the political
boycott as a means of redressing grievances. The Court views the political boycott as a means by which otherwise weak groups may affect
social change without resort to **riot or revolution.""' The holding is
not confined to a narrow type of boycott. such as the antidiscrimination
boycott of the instant case. but is broadly stated in terms of a political
boycott. The structure of Claiborne Hard'are is such that it can be
interpreted so broadly as to grant protection to any activity which can
be broken down into constituent activities, most of which are themsclves protected. and which represent a banding together for the purpose of political protest.
One can expect Claiborne Hardware to displace Thornhill as the
leading authority for future political boycott cases. Future court decisions no doubt will adopt the Claiborne Hardware balancing test: its
clcmentizing of the activity, thereby separating protected elemenis
from unprotected elements: and the accordant allocation of damages
115

In Anota Amuscmrnt Corp.

Doe. 171 Mnc. 279. 12 N Y.S 2d 400 iSup Ct. 1939I)

N,%totting to force an emplo,.er to hure blacks %as deemed lay ful a$ a matter ofrnght. %%hereas.n
Ilughcs - Superior Court of California. 339 U S 460 (19501. boycotting to 5ecurc the dcmandt
that Lucky Stores hire blacks untd the proportin of black clerks to white clrks approim-Mted the
r(JIo of blaCk customer to
customCrs 'as deVmcd unlawful.
106 See Cox v. Louuiana. 379 U.S. 536 (1965). Walker v B3rmangbm. 388 U.S 307 11967)
Seealws L TRIBE. Frtam 31.as 593.

~hate

107. The spccch-plus desgnation was fim appled to picketing in 77hoAdL See .ur/, u note
2')
IONt The speech-plus desamatuo as not helpful In the pocess of determining ahenher or not a
particular ACtIa IIV s eisaxpcsse conduct %orthyof first amendment protel.1.on. Once conduct has
been determinned to be protected at can then be dc-scnbcd in conclusion as -speech-plus.- Se- L

1Iaih. i:pra note 31. at 598
1W

Clawhotne Ilarduare. 102 S. CL at 3425
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for those unprotected activities. Future political boycotts are likely to
be upheld (I) when they are motivated primarily by a legitimate political aim and (2) when any associated acts of violence are insubstantial
rather than pervasive.
Methods used to attack the political boycott through litigation will
certainly be affected. The boycott at hand withstood a charge of malicious interference. This tort allegation is unlikely to succeed against
future political boycotts. The economic interests of the boycotted businesses are not likely to amount to the substantial state interests
needed"10 to outweigh the interest in protecting first amendment rights.
A conspiracy claim is unlikely to succeed. One cannot infer the agreement required to prove a conspiracy from mere association in an organization: a characterization of violence cannot result from a
relatively few violent acts."' After Claiborne Hardwaresuch "guilt by
association" is insufficient as antithetical to the freedom of association
and inconsistent with a finding that some boycotters voluntarily participate. The rule that coercion is dispositive of a conspiracy is inconsistent with ClaiborneHardware. Coercion will not taint the effort unless
the effort is first shown to be a conspiracy, that is. there is a fact finding

of express agreement among the participants to use coercion. The
Court obliterated the distinction between persuasion and coercion, a
distinction upon which some courts and commentators had previously
relied in deciding whether a conspiracy existed." 2
A cause of action for violation of a state anti-trust statute or the
Sherman Act is perhaps most unlikely to succeed. ClaiborneHardware
reinforced the finding of Noerr Motor Freight that these statutes do not
apply to a boycott motivated primarily by political concerns. Rather.
the intent of these statutes is to prohibit a boycott where the primary
motivation is economic concerns.
The fate of the "secondary" political boycott or scapegoat boycott is
uncertain." 1 A scapegoat boycott is one in which the target of the boy110 In a footnote. the Supreme Court suggests the level of state interest needed to outweigh
the boycoter's freedom of expression. Id at n.47.
I 1. The Court stated in order to characterize an effort to change the social, political, and
economic structure of an environment as a conspiracy such characterization -must be supported
by findings that adequately disclose the evidentiary basis for concluding that specific partics
agreed to use unlawful means, that carefully identify the impact of such unlawful conduct, and
that recognize the importance of avoiding the imposition of punishment for constitutionally protected activity." Id at 3437.
112. See Note. spra note 29. See Note. Clenched FR. jupra note 34. In Southern Christian
Leadership Council v. A.G. Corp.. 241 So. 2d 619 (Miss. 1970). the named plaintiff and other
citizens of Grenada. Mississippi were held liable for damages to the defendant, a local grocery
business, because coercion was employed to force members of the black community to force them
to join the boycott.
113. In Rouse Philadelphia. Inc. v. Ad floc '78.274 Pa. Super. 54. 417 A.2d 1248 (1979). cert.
denied. 449 U.S. 1004 (1980). the political boycott was held not protected -here members of Ad
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cott is not a party to the dispute and the goal is only to pressure the
boycott target to influence the one against whom the grievance is assessed. The facts in CaliborneHardware do not fit the category of the
scapegoat boycott-many of the merchants were also civic leaders and
consequently in a position to address the protestor's demands. Furthermore, all the merchants were in a position to meet at least one of the
boycotter's demands-the hiring of black employees. At present the
scapegoat boycott is possibly open to attack. In a footnote, the Court
specifically withheld judgment on "a narrowly tailored statute designed
to prohibit . . . certain types of secondary pressure.""' 4 This highly
significant footnote also did not preclude prohibition of a political boycott which violated a narrowly tailored anticompetitive statute or one
whose aims were prohibited by any valid state law.
In addition to the possibly forewarning footnote just mentioned.
Claiborne Hardware offers only vague guidance as to when future
political boycotts will be prohibited. Purpose will be the touchstone." 5
The Court gave approval of the purpose of eradicating racial inequality. Means is the second most important consideration."' Isolated incidents of violence will not forestall first amendment protection:
pervasive violence will. By characterizing coercion as linked to persuasive protected speech, the Court implied that no amount of coercion
would render a boycott unprotected so long as the boycotters did not
specifically agree to use coercion. Future cases will hopefully convey
clearer guidelines regarding a sufficiently legitimate political purpose
and acceptable means to effectuate that purpose.
Future political boycott litigation will not focus only on whether a
particular boycott is protected activity: a central concern will be the
question of damages. The ClaiborneHardware rule allows recovery for
only the direct consequences of violent conduct. No damages can be
assessed for consequences of protected activity. Calculating losses directly attributable to violence or other illegal acts creates an evidentiary
problem, especially when those acts are mixed with legally protected
ones. The precision of regulation necessary wi.-n first amendment protection is involved will be difficult to ascertain.
Hoc '78 picketed a shopping mall to urge others to boycott those stores. The picketers admitted
their activity was an attempt to publicize their disputes with the government. A temporary injunction was granted because the court deemed both the method and purpose improper in light of the
mall's inability to affect the dispute between the picketers and the government.
114. Claiborne Ilardk re, 102 S. Ct. at 3427 n.49.
115. "At times the difference between lawful and unlawful collectivc activity may be idenitlicd
easily by reference to its purpose." Id. at 3436.
116. "The charge of illegality-like the claim of constitutional protection--dcrives from the
means employed by the participants to achieve those goals.- Id
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CONCLUSION

NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware is the first word from the United
States Supreme Court on the subject of the political boycott. The political boycott is assured first amendment protection as long as its primary
purpose is political, the target of the boycott is connected with the
boycotters' dispute, and the means used are associated with no more
than insubstantial findings of violence. Only when violence is pervasive may all losses be recovered and all aspects of the boycott be enjoined. When violence is insubstantial, damages may be assigned for
only the direct consequences of the violent or illegal conduct of the
boycott. No injunctions may be ordered to stop protected activity.
SUSAN SHELL IDDINGS
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